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Competition in the Spanish domestic airline sector: Market deregulation, switching 
costs and route cost behaviour
1. Introduction
The importance of incumbent cost reaction to low-cost market entry research was initially 
proposed by Särndal and Statton (1975) when they suggested that a competitor’s business 
profile, either high-cost or low-cost carriers (LCCs), is a critical factor for competition in the 
airline sector. The competitive advantages of LCCs and the different incumbent reactions to 
their entry, for example, cost reduction, increased operating efficiency and creation of low 
cost (LC) subsidiaries, are considered key elements of firm survival in this new competitive 
environment (Morrell, 2005; Oum et al., 2005). However, researchers have paid little 
attention to the effect of incumbent cost reaction on market (route) entry (Sancho-Esper and 
Mas-Ruiz, 2016) given the difficulties or even impossibility of quantifying key cost drivers, 
since airlines are not required to disclose cost information at route-level. The system-wide 
data available does not help in answering these types of research questions. Because of this, 
existing literature has focused on analysing the firm-level overall cost differences of 
established carriers when faced with the entry of an LCC to the market (Forsyth, 2001) rather 
than analysing route-level cost reaction. 
An interesting finding of this existing research is the fact that, when prices determine 
customer switching, it is helpful to evaluate costs together with the various service elements. 
For example, LC entrants’ optimal cost structures and fewer customer facilities can force 
traditional carriers to reduce their costs (Tan, 2016). Incumbents can also react to LC market 
entries by reducing their network size and the number of operations to reduce costs and regain 
profitability (Tsoukalas et al., 2008). Regarding this, researchers have suggested that the key 
question here relates not only to the comparisons between incumbent and low-cost entrants’ 
costs at firm-level, but rather to their costs and services at route-level. These researchers point 
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out that the use of smaller aircraft on short-haul routes can minimize costs (Fageda, 2009) and 
high flight frequency on these routes can also reduce costs if demand-side advantages can be 
sustained. This paper extends these ideas by focusing on incumbent operating cost response at 
route-level and by considering flight frequency as a service element.
In addition, this study considers that incumbent cost reaction to entry is conditioned by the 
relationship between the established firm and the new entrant, in terms of incumbent 
switching costs (SwCs) related to the new entrant. It is assumed that SwCs have important 
dynamic effects, which can affect incumbent cost behaviour. Until now, literature on SwCs has 
focused on price reaction to market entry in regulated/deregulated environments. In service 
industries like airlines, in a context of stable switching costs over a regulated period, the 
incumbent firm takes advantage f market power derived from a better exploitation of 
frequent flyer programs (FFPs), and this advantage may explain why established firms tend to 
accommodate the LC entrants’ prices, rather than trying to match them. In fact, before 
deregulation, consumers did not prefer lower prices when these corresponded to lower service 
quality (Gual and Vives, 1991). However, after the substantial price fall following 
deregulation, new low SwCs customers who preferred lower quality associated with lower 
prices made an appearance. Thus, in this new context, there is no place for an incumbent 
pacifist attitude. Under deregulation, incumbents become more aggressive in their pricing 
because they are pursued by new LC entrants who are able to build up their own customer 
networks and achieve optimal productive scales (Daraban and Fournier, 2008; Goolsbee and 
Syverson, 2008). The present study extends this logic and therefore expects that lower SwCs 
induce a dynamic asymmetric cost response from established firms, evolving from a context 
where non-threatening LC entrants expect to suffer a small number of minor retaliations from 
incumbents, to a context where aggressive LC entrants expect a large number of greater 
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retaliations from incumbents. These expected results have important implications for both 
public regulators of airspace as well as for airline managers. 
The objective of this manuscript is twofold. First, it analyses the operating cost behaviour and 
service elements at route-level, as well as the SwCs of established carriers in the Spanish 
domestic airline market from 2000 to 2009. Second, it studies the relationship between SwCs 
and incumbent cost response to entry at route-level, taking into account the moderating role of 
the entrant business profile (formerly regulated vs. LCC) and regulatory context (airport 
restrictions in place between 2000 and 2005, and after their elimination from 2006 to 2009). 
The estimation of this model involves the calculation of operating costs for each carrier and 
route in the Spanish airline domestic market where incumbents reacted to market entries from 
2000 to 2009.
2. Incumbent cost response to LCC market entry: Switching costs and deregulation
An important line of research, mainly based on economic approaches, suggests that 
incumbent response to market entry is asymmetric and depends on the specific features of the 
entrant, such as the scale of the entry, the incumbent market share and incumbent economies 
of density at hub-level (e.g., Bilotkach et al., 2010; Gayle and Wu, 2013; Oliveira and Huse, 
2009). Instead, this study considers SwCs to be a key element that connect the entrant 
business profile and the incumbent when analysing incumbent cost reaction to market entry, 
which in turns affects the entry conditions and the later incumbent response. 
A product has classic SwCs if it is repeatedly purchased by a buyer who will find it costly to 
switch from one seller to another (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). This study builds on the 
approach of pecuniary SwCs, a specific type of SwC which are artificially created at the 
incumbent’s discretion, and constitute a form of quantity discount (Klemperer, 1987a; 1987b) 
that prevails in the airline industry. This approach suggests that passengers enrolled on FFPs 
are rewarded for repeated trips with the same carrier. These SwCs create brand loyalty in 
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travellers once they have bought services from a particular airline, while travellers who switch 
between airlines lose opportunities to earn points that yield benefits, such as free or reduced-
cost trips (Fageda, 2009; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). This idea is extended by assuming that 
SwCs have important dynamic effects which can impact incumbent cost behaviour as a reaction 
to LC entrants and as the environment evolves from regulation to deregulation. In Section 3.2 of 
this paper, several dimensions of the concept of SwCs are considered. The first defines SwCs 
as the cost in monetary terms that a customer incurs to change from their established firm to 
one of its competitors (Shy, 2002). Alongside this dimension of SwCs that defines it in 
monetary terms, and according to Carlsson and Löfgren (2006), SwCs can also be quantified 
in the sense of loss of benefits and service elements to passengers, such as brand loyalty 
derived from frequent flyer benefits. In other words, the competitive scope of the incumbent 
in terms of its route network acts as an indicator of the breadth of the relationship between the 
customer and the focal firm, and the age of the incumbent’s FFP acts as an indicator of the 
potential length of the relationship between the customer and the focal firm.
2.1. Switching costs and incumbent cost reaction to entry under regulatory constraints
Essentially, high SwCs tend to reduce competition between firms because they create captive 
clients who can be ‘squeezed’. In markets where consumers face high SwCs, a firm’s market 
share determines its profits. That income, derived from market power, increases with the size 
of its client base (Carlsson and Löfgren, 2006; Dorotic et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2001). 
Conversely, low SwCs promote competition because they incite firms to attract new clients. 
In addition, SwCs can vary across customers (de Boer and Gudmundsson, 2012; Martín et al., 
2011; Polo and Sesé, 2009). A regulated airline industry imposes a two-tier fare system, 
where, for example, SwCs are higher for business travellers because these passengers are 
more time-sensitive but less price-sensitive, since lower prices lead to a greater sacrifice of 
the benefits of an FFP. Meanwhile, in this scenario, SwCs are lower for leisure travellers, 
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because they are less time-sensitive but more price-sensitive (Fageda, 2009). Firms belonging 
to industries with this type of structure can effectively implement market segmentation 
through price discrimination and can coexist at different levels of rivalry (Farrell and 
Klemperer, 2007).
This segmentation can be considered a specific example of fat cat incumbent strategy (see 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984), pursued by puppy dog new LC entrants (see Call and Keeler, 
1985). These terms describe an incumbent that is able to segment its markets effectively, and so 
responds to entry by reducing prices and service quality to hold on to price-sensitive passengers, 
and also uses tools like FFPs to keep the loyalty of higher-yield segments without price 
matching. In such a context, a new entrant will find it difficult to compete with a price-matching 
incumbent which will tend to retain passengers as they are accumulating rewards in the 
incumbent’s FFP (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). In short, the market is segmented with a simple 
two-tier fare system, and business passengers, who have higher SwCs, respond less to price 
variations than tourists (Levine, 1987). In the US domestic airline industry, this simple two-tier 
fare system was supported by a price regulation that imposed a rigid fare structure until 1978. 
A similar two-tier fare system prevailed in Spain until 2004 (see below).
In any case, previous literature on SwCs under price regulation has been focused on price 
reaction to market entry. Alternatively, this study considers that market power derived from 
SwCs, namely, the exploitation of FFPs, may explain incumbent cost reaction, conditioned by 
entrants’ cost structures. This study considers an LC entrant (at a competitive disadvantage in 
terms of FFPs) to be less of a challenge. Therefore, under low SwCs, customers are able to 
switch only up to a certain point; and so it is expected that, in terms of costs, incumbents may 
react less to LC entrants compared to similar cost entrants.
In addition, this expected incumbent cost behaviour could be reinforced by entry regulations 
that increase the market power derived from SwCs. Supporting this assumption is Oliveira and 
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Huse’s (2009) observation, that incumbents offering FFPs can also take advantage of flight 
frequency and a large, single-carrier route network. In essence, entry regulation can lead to an 
institutional structure with first-mover advantages in terms of endowment location, particularly 
at slot-constrained or gate-constrained airports, which serve to distinguish formerly regulated 
carriers from new LC entrants (Peteraf, 1993). Incumbent airlines can gain advantages by 
exploiting privileged access to airport scarce resources (slots and gates) which are important 
entry barriers (Borenstein, 1989). In the Spanish domestic market, even after removing legal 
restrictions on the entry of EU carriers in 1997, only small foreign LC carriers, for example, 
Virgin Express, Eurowing and Easyjet, entered domestic routes, and began to operate secondary 
markets (Fageda and Fernández-Villadangos, 2009) due to the fact that incumbent national 
carriers were still taking advantage f their former control over airport facilities which acted as 
an entry barrier. This restrictive environment drives incumbents to improve their service 
quality in terms of flight frequency and route network, in order to increase the effects of 
market power derived from SwCs, namely, the exploitation of FFPs.
Regarding demand analysis, business travellers may attach greater importance to frequent flight 
schedules and a large single-carrier network, perhaps with first-class service; whereas leisure 
travellers may place little value on these comforts and conveniences (Call and Keeler, 1985; 
Dorotic et al., 2012; Klophaus, 2005; Martín et al., 2011). This drives incumbents to promote 
FFPs because a higher flight frequency (in airports where slots and gates are constrained for 
entrants) speeds up point accumulation (Fageda, 2009). In addition, a large single-carrier 
network creates scope economies for business travellers, since choosing an airline with a wider 
variety of destinations will make it easier for them to earn rewards (Farrell and Klemperer, 
2007; Levine, 1987). Contrary, new LC entrants do not have a frequent flyer base ─or large 
networks for that matter─ and so they are at a competitive disadvantage in terms of SwCs in 
relation to incumbents (Klophaus, 2005). In brief, flight frequency and a large network allow 
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incumbents exploiting SwCs through FFPs to accumulate greater market power (Dorotic et 
al., 2012); hence, this study considers that incumbents have less incentive to reduce costs, 
even though Fageda (2009) suggests that flight frequency can facilitate the exploitation of 
efficiency through density economies on the cost side. 
Based on the above, the market power derived from SwCs, supported by a context of price and 
entry restrictions, may explain the incumbent cost reaction, conditioned by the cost structure 
of the entrants. In this restricted situation, it is expected that a LC entrant is less of a 
challenge, and therefore the following research hypothesis is proposed:
H1. In an industry with price and entry restrictions, lower switching costs induce incumbents 
to make smaller cost reactions and accommodate when competing against low-cost entrants 
compared to formerly regulated entrants.
2.2. Dynamic switching costs and incumbent cost reaction to entry under deregulation
In general, previous strategies assume that markets with SwCs are stable and comprise 
incumbents which act as less aggressive fat cats in relation to non-threatening LC entrants. 
However, SwCs can also have important dynamic effects (Gual and Vives, 1991; Villas-Boas, 
2015) and, as Farrell and Klemperer (2007) argue, the opposite scenario is also possible. 
Incumbents may also act as more aggressive top dogs: for example, if US airline sector 
customers were asked, before price deregulation, if they preferred lower service quality (in 
terms of waiting times, boarding services, etc.) in a trade-off for lower fares, they may have 
refused. But, as deregulation occurred, fares substantially decreased and converged, air traffic 
remarkably increased and a new low-SwC customer appeared in the airline sector (Gual and 
Vives, 1991). Before price deregulation, airline markets were segmented by means of a two-tier 
fare system, but deregulation increased the difficulty of maintaining such segmentation 
methods because of acute pressures to keep seats filled. This system was replaced by complex 
fare structures that reflect different conditions and markets (Levine, 1987). These new fare 
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structures control aircraft capacity through inventory management programs, dividing the 
aircraft into subunits to be sold on different terms to different market segments and allowing 
airlines to optimize a simultaneous service to price-sensitive and less-sensitive portions of the 
market. In this context of dynamic SwCs, when price restrictions are removed, fat cat 
incumbents tend to evolve into top dogs because they are pursued by lean and hungry new 
entrants (see Call and Keeler, 1985). 
In any case, previous literature on SwCs after price deregulation has been focused on price 
reaction to market entry. Alternatively, this paper considers that, when there are low SwCs, in 
terms of costs, incumbents may be more prone to react to LC entrants than to similar cost 
entrants. In addition, this expected incumbent cost behaviour would be reinforced by the 
removal of entrant capacity restrictions. Ultimately, the elimination of the competitive 
restraints at airports occurs parallel to the massive entry of LCCs (Bottasso et al., 2017; 
Wiltshire, 2018; Thelle and la Cour, 2018). Furthermore, in the period of transition to a 
deregulated airline environment, the incumbent fat cat strategy will cease to apply over time: 
as the new LC entrant becomes better established, it will be able to expand its frequency, 
build up its own network, and become more trusted by business people as a means of travel 
(Call and Keeler, 1985; Dobruszkes, 2006). In fact, nowadays, EasyJet and Ryanair have the 
largest networks in Europe and many LCCs have developed their own business flight 
programs. Passenger relationship management has become a vital concern even for the LCCs 
(Akamavi et al., 2015; Palmer et al., 2016). If the cost structure of a new entrant (mainly 
LCCs) is more efficient than that of the incumbent, and without entry restrictions preventing 
the entrant from achieving optimal production capacity, it can make large-scale entries and 
send a signal of its commitment in such markets to existing competitors. This aggressive entry 
will be perceived as threatening to existing competitors who will respond quickly and 
robustly (Gatignon and Bansal, 1990; Tan, 2016; Varella et al., 2017; Gorin and Belobaba, 
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2008). Levine (1987) suggests that in this situation, established carriers would inexorably be 
transformed into top dogs, forced to lower their costs and simplify their fare structures, or fail. 
The incumbent reaction of reducing costs would show that the most efficient innovators 
destabilize an industry and the least efficient must exit (Candela, 2008). Thus, an entry of a 
more viable competitor pressures incumbents to improve their efficiency (Kangis and 
O’Reilly, 2003; Hannigan et al., 2015), providing a ‘wake-up call’ to act if they want to 
remain a viable competitor.
In the Spanish airline industry, entry capacity restrictions were removed with, since 2004, a 
huge public investment in airports to increase their capacity. This occurred in parallel to the 
increase of LC entrants (Fageda and Fernández-Villadangos, 2009; Sancho-Esper and Mas-
Ruiz, 2016), and, according to the above logic, a rise in the competitive pressures on 
incumbent firms to improve efficiency. In view of the above, the dynamic effects of SwCs in 
an industry with unrestricted price and entry threaten firm stability, and so the following 
research hypothesis is proposed:
H2. In an industry with unrestricted price and entry, lower switching costs induce incumbents 
to make greater cost reactions when competing against low-cost entrants compared to 
formerly regulated entrants.
3. Sample, methodology and variables
3.1. Descriptive analysis of routes and carriers 
The analysis of the Spanish domestic airline market is based on the following data collection 
process. Firstly, potential competitive reactions of incumbent airlines to a competitive entry 
were identified, within the parameters of given routes in the Spanish airline market between 
2000 and 2009. To this end, the AENA database (which provides general traffic and 
passenger data) was searched and the routes of 38 airports were selected from a total of 45. 
The 38 airports selected have a minimum level of regular commercial operation, with 300 
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flights per year and 10,000 passengers (PAX) per year. At these airports, potential reactions 
by incumbents could be observed. A potential reaction to entry from an established firm is 
considered to occur when an incumbent carrier is operating a route and faces the entry of a 
new competitor on this same route, for example, if Iberia and Air Europa are incumbents 
operating the Barcelona-Madrid route and Ryanair enters this route, this would produce two 
potential reactions; one from Iberia and another from Air Europa. A route is included in the 
sample if it has a minimum of two airlines jointly operating on it between 2000 and 2009, and 
if there is an entry that may cause a potential reaction. There were 193 routes with potential 
reactions in Spain’s domestic market (from a total of 703 routes) between 2000 and 2009.
Eleven airlines operate scheduled domestic operations (excluding charter operations) on these 
193 routes. They are categorised by business profile: i) formerly regulated carriers (national: 
Iberia, Air Europa and Spanair; and regional: Air Nostrum, Binter and Naysa); and ii) LCCs 
(Vueling, Clickair, Ryanair, Air Berlin and Easyjet). The evolution of market share of the 
carriers operating the selected routes, in terms of PAX, shows a gradual reduction of the 
formerly regulated carriers’ market share, from 64 % in 2000 down to 47 % in 2009; while 
the LCCs’ market share shows important growth from 2.5 % in 2000 up to 35 % in 2009 due, 
mainly, to the improved capacity of Spain’s airport infrastructure. The selected routes show 
394 entries in the 2000s. Until 2005 the entry of formerly regulated carriers prevails (Spanair 
and Air Europa). However, in the second half of the decade, the entry of international LCCs 
(Ryanair, Air Berlin and Easyjet) prevails. This qualitative change in entrant profile, also 
observed by Aguiló et al. (2007), could have generated a change in the reaction strategy of 
established firms in domestic markets (Fageda, 2009). Lastly, the selected routes show 661 
potential reactions from established carriers to 394 competitive entries between 2000 and 
2009. In general, potential reactions from formerly regulated carriers prevail. Until 2005 the 
number of reactions is stable, with exponential growth during the second half of the decade, 
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partly due to the huge investment in Spanish airports and the threat of new LC entrants 
(Fageda and Fernández-Villadangos, 2009).
Secondly, information was gathered on the different variables (see Section 3.2) related to the 
661 potential reactions, and the operating costs of the carriers involved in such operations are 
estimated. 
3.2. Methodology and variables
The incumbent cost response model used here relates the behaviour of the established firm in 
response to an entry and the relevant variables that condition such behaviour. It proposes a 
dynamic specification [1] with the dependent variable in differences. For each reaction k, 
defined by incumbent firm i in route m and given entrant j and period t, the incumbent’s 
response is measured as the difference in average costs in current period t  and average (𝑦𝑘,𝑡)
costs in previous period t-1 .(𝑦𝑘,𝑡 ― 1)
The panel data structure of reactions allows for the analysis of incumbent cost behaviour (∆
 related to each new market entry, taking into account the joint effect of incumbent Cost𝑘,𝑡)
SwCs and the type of entrant (interaction effect), as well as the control variables (incumbent 
market dominance, market concentration and tourist destination index). Where the dependent 
variable ( ) measures the variation in the incumbent’s average flight operating cost [2] ∆Cost𝑘,𝑡
(Costk,t – Costk,t-1) for a given route (See appendix A1 for more detail). The independent 
variables are the interaction effects between the incumbent SwCs and the type of entrant 
(formerly regulated and LCC), and they assess the differential effect of SwCs between the 
different types of entrant carriers. The classification by type of airline (formerly regulated: 
national and regional; and LCCs) is based on the regulatory and institutional structure of 
Spain’s domestic market. Formerly regulated carriers are not restrained by the initial airport 
capacity limitations or entry restrictions for foreign companies (non-European carriers), and 
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are able to exploit first-mover advantages at monopoly and/or slot-constrained airports, as 
well as their higher operating costs. 
Furthermore, three measures of incumbent SwCs, aimed at quantifying the different 
dimensions of the concept based on the available data [3] are used. Firstly, according to Shy 
(2002), SwCs can be defined as the cost in monetary terms that a current customer incurs to 
change from the established firm to one of its competitors (monetary SwC). Alongside this 
dimension, SwCs are also quantified here in the sense of loss of benefits and service elements 
to current passengers, such as brand loyalty derived from frequent flyer benefits. In this way, 
and based on Carlsson and Löfgren (2006), two additional variables are included to quantify 
the importance of FFP in creating SwCs for customers in a given market: the incumbent 
competitive scope (incumbent market scope) which refers to the route network; and the age of 
the incumbent FFP (See appendix 1 for more detail). 
In Eq. (1) the incumbent operating cost response to market entry is modelled as a function of 
the three different measurements of incumbents’ SwCs, taking into account the type of entrant 
(moderation effect) and the main control variables.
ΔCOSTk,t = ΔCOSTk,t -1+ β1 [monetary SwC * (D low-cost entrant)]k,t-1
        + β2 [monetary SwC * (D formerly regulated entrant)]k,t-1 
        + β3 [incumbent market scope * (D low-cost entrant)]k,t-1
        + β4 [incumbent market scope * (D formerly regulated entrant)]k,t-1
        + β5 [FFP age * (D low-cost entrant)]k,t-1
        + β6 [FFP age * (D formerly regulated entrant)]k,t-1
        + β7 [incumbent market dominance]k,t-1
        + β8 [market concentration]k,t-1  + β9 [D tourist destination index]k,t-1  + εk,t                        (Eq. 1)
3.3. Econometric implementation
The data used to estimate the incumbent cost response to entry model is structured as a 
balanced panel, including 620 incumbent reactions (k) where their operating cost behaviour is 
observed over six quarters after each market entry (t= 0,1,…, +6), occurring between 2000 
and 2009. The proposed model is estimated in two periods (2000-2005 and 2006-2009) based 
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on the structural changes that occurred in the Spanish domestic airline sector (see Section 2.2 
for more information) and also supported by the statistical change in the dependent variable 
(incumbent cost reaction) in the second half of the decade.
Panel data methods are used to tackle the potential bias due to unobservable heterogeneity and 
potential endogeneity of regressors (Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2005). Hence, individual 
(incumbent reaction) heterogeneity is controlled for by modelling it as reaction-specific (ηi), 
which is then eliminated by taking the first differences of the variables (see Garin-Munoz and 
Montero-Martín, 2007; Clougherty and Zhang, 2009 for studies of the airline sector). 
Moreover, an instrumental variable method is used to control for the potential endogeneity of 
the explanatory variables, which has been previously used by Borenstein (1991). In this 
respect, the most suitable alternative is the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator because it embeds all other instrumental variable methods as special cases (Ogaki, 
1993). Moreover, the GMM estimator is particularly appropriate for the present study given 
the dynamic nature of airline cost reaction, which requires the inclusion of lagged cost 
reaction as an explanatory variable in the empirical model used here.
This approach imposes an additional restriction that is met by the dataset (balanced panel). 
That is, at least four consecutive quarters of information per reaction relative to the entry are 
needed in order to test for the absence of second order correlation using the GMM assumption 
estimation method.
Regarding instrument selection, and given the extreme difficulty of finding valid external 
instruments that comply with the validity conditions, the GMM is used here, and it relies on a 
set of internal instruments (i.e., the lags of the explanatory variables), thus eliminating the 
need for external instrumental variables (see Rey et al., 2011; Escobari, 2012 for studies of 
the airline sector). Concretely, in this case, the instruments are the lags of all right-hand side 
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variables in the model, since these lags are highly correlated with the regressors that they 
instrument (there are three periods available before each entry: t= -3, -2, -1).
To verify that the GMM is a suitable method for this study, a sequential process has been 
followed where the results obtained from the estimation of the baseline specification using 
different estimators have been compared (available upon request). The Hansen J statistic of 
overidentifying restrictions is used to test for the absence of correlation between the 
instruments and the error term. Moreover, several tests have been performed to check for the 
potential misspecification of the model. The m2 statistic is used to test for the lack of second-
order correlation in the first-difference residual (Arellano and Bond, 1991) whereas the z1 and 
z2 statistics are Wald tests that analyse the joint significance of the reported coefficients and of 
the year dummy variables respectively. The estimation is carried out using the xtabond2 
package in STATA, following procedures outlined by Roodman (2009).
4. Results
4.1. Operating cost and SwCs of the established carriers in the Spanish domestic market
Regarding incumbent operating costs, the measurement proposed by Sancho-Esper and Mas-
Ruiz (2016) based on ATA standards is used. This approach overcomes the general 
limitations of studies based on firm-level aggregate accounting data (e.g., Encaoua, 1991; 
Gillen et al., 1990; Morrell, 2005), deriving from the fact that they do not analyse full 
operating costs for each carrier at the route-level for a given time period. Incumbent 
Operating Costs (IOC) data (see Table 1) reveals that, during the first period, formerly 
regulated incumbents show greater operating costs in the face of entry of other formerly 
regulated carriers (e.g., 10,964.3) compared to when LCC incumbents enter (e.g., 8,783.2). 
However, this difference disappears during the second period (2006-09) partly due to the cost 
controls implemented by the formerly regulated incumbents and the general increase of costs 
affecting all carriers, for example, jet-fuel expenditures and airport and navigation taxes. 
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Complementarily, Incumbent Cost Reaction (CR) to market entry (cost difference between 
consecutive quarters for each incumbent reaction) reveals that both types of incumbents do 
not reduce their operating costs during the first period, whereas once entry capacity 
restrictions are removed, they implement important operating cost adjustments (see Table 1). 
It is worth highlighting that both types of incumbents perform greater cost reductions in 
reaction to LC entrants than in reaction to formerly regulated entrants from 2006 to 2009.
< Insert Table 1 about here>
Complementary to these cost figures, it is necessary to analyse other service elements, such as 
Incumbent Flight Frequency (IFF). Table 1 evidences that both types of incumbents pursue 
different service strategies related to their flight frequency (number of monthly flights of the 
incumbent carrier on a given route). As expected, formerly regulated incumbents offer a 
greater flight frequency than LCCs, although this difference is substantially reduced in the 
second period, once entry capacity restrictions are removed. 
In addition, in findings similar to those reported by Peteraf (1993), firms within the Spanish 
airline sector began the deregulatory period with asymmetrical cost structures. Formerly 
regulated carriers enter the new era with higher labour costs due to strong unions, while new 
entrants without labour unions thusly benefit from more flexible work regulations and a lower 
wage bill. These incumbents also had a given fleet mix, so in the mid-term were affected by 
long production lags and gluts. However, these cost structures could be adjusted at the mid-
term by reallocating and improving their production techniques, as well as increasing 
productive capacity, highlighting the importance of the route-level analysis. From 2004 to 
2013, formerly regulated carriers in the Spanish domestic airline market made constant 
aircraft reallocations at route-level to adapt to the competition and demand, alongside huge 
investments in new aircraft models to improve their relative efficiency. For example, Iberia 
acquired the A320 and A321 in 2006, Air Nostrum started flying the B737NG and A330 in 
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2006, and Spanair added the B717 to its fleet in 2007. Moreover, Iberia, the most important 
formerly regulated carrier, set up a LC subsidiary, Clickair [4] in 2006 to operate short-haul 
routes with less labour restrictions. In addition, the whole group of formerly regulated carriers 
signed around twenty collective agreements and revisions affecting crew salaries from 2000 
to 2013.
Finally, Table 2 shows three complementary measures of SwCs (monetary SwC, incumbent 
market scope and age of the FFP) that quantify the SwCs of established carriers in the Spanish 
domestic market from 2000 to 2009. Monetary SwC data reveals that, regardless of the 
period, formerly regulated carriers show greater SwCs than the LCCs. Additionally, it was 
found that, regardless the type of carrier, there is a substantial increase in the incumbent SwCs 
between the first (2000-2005) and the second period (2006-2009), this increase being greater 
for formerly regulated incumbents. Second, formerly regulated carriers’ scope (number of 
destinations offered by the incumbent) is greater than that of the LCCs, congruent with the 
Hub-and-Spoke versus the point-to-point generic strategies (Dobruszkes, 2006), respectively. 
There is also a substantial increase in the number of destinations offered by formerly 
regulated carriers, whereas the number of destinations remained stable for the LCCs. Finally, 
the age of the loyalty programs (in months) reflects that formerly regulated FFPs allow 
travellers to earn more points/miles than those promoted by the LCCs, noting however, that 
some LCCs such as Air Berlin, Clickair and Vueling, start to increase benefits for customers 
during the second period (2006-2009).
< Insert Table 2 about here>
The aforementioned measures support the efforts made by established carriers in the Spanish 
domestic market to increase SwCs in comparison to their competitors, to make passenger 
migration to new entrants more difficult. Different types of carriers seem to have different 
strategies regarding SwCs. While formerly regulated carriers try to increase their monetary 
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SwCs, market scope and the availability of FFPs; only a set of LCCs, that does not include 
Clickair, Ryanair and EasyJet, pursue an increase in monetary SwCs and the establishment of 
FFPs once capacity restrictions are removed (2006-2009).
4.2. Relationship between SwCs and incumbent cost response to market entry in the 
Spanish airline domestic market
In this section the relationship between incumbent SwCs and cost response to market entry is 
analysed, taking into account the profile of the entrant and the period in which the entry takes 
place. The panel data model in Eq. (1) is estimated (see Table 3) using a difference GMM, 
distinguishing between reactions under entry capacity restraints (2000-2005) and once these 
restraints are removed (2006-2009). Overall, all the specification tests for the three proposed 
models show that the required results yield reliable and consistent estimates. That is, both the 
joint inclusion of the explanatory variables and the joint inclusion of year dummies are 
statistically significant (z1 and z2). Moreover, there is not second order correlation between 
the residuals of the model (m2= 0, a basic requirement for GMM estimation) and all models 
are over identified according to the Hansen J test (supporting the joint validity of the included 
instruments). 
< Insert Table 3 about here>
The three GMM estimations indicate that the joint inclusion of the three indicators of SwCs 
(model 3) show equivalent results rather than individual estimations (models 1 and 2). 
Moreover, the comparison between periods suggests that regulatory changes affect the 
relationship between the three dimensions of SwCs and incumbent cost reaction (model 3). 
Thus, monetary SwCs that are non-significant during the first period become significant in the 
second when facing the entrance of both LCCs and formerly regulated carriers. However, the 
magnitude of the effect in each case suggests that LCC entrants become a more important 
threat (βMonetSWC_LCC, 2006-09= -1,975.98, p<0.01 and βMonetSWC_Former, 2006-09= -1,095.88, p<0.01). 
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The relationship between incumbent scope and cost reaction also changes between periods; it 
is significant in the first period for both types of entrants, but quantitatively less important for 
LC entrants (βScope_LCC, 2000-05 = -164.70, p<0.05 and βScope_Former, 2000-05= -382.72, p<0.1); while 
during the second period the relationship remains significant only when facing LCC entrants 
(βScope_LCC, 2006-09 = -249.35, p<0.1). Finally, the relationship between FFP age and incumbent 
cost reaction to entry also substantially changes between periods. While during the first period 
it is not significant either for LCC entrants or for formerly regulated carriers; it becomes 
significant for both types of entrants once capacity restraints are removed. However, the 
magnitude of the effect in each case suggests that LCC entrants become a more important 
threat (βFFPage_LCC, 2006-09= -170.75, p<0.01 and βFFPage_Former, 2006-09= -89.69, p<0.01).
In general, these results show that the relationship between incumbent SwCs and cost reaction 
is moderated by the type of entrant airline (formerly regulated vs. LCCs) and is conditioned 
by the regulatory and institutional context at entry period. Under entry capacity restrictions, 
the power that incumbent market scope (non-monetary SwCs) has in explaining incumbent 
operating cost reaction to entry (its coefficient is significant) is less for LCC entrants, so 
Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected for this dimension of SwCs. This result can be explained by 
the fact that in a period of stable SwCs, consumers do not prefer lower prices as a trade-off 
for lower service quality (Gual and Vives, 1991). The incumbent firm can take advantage of 
the market power derived from better exploitation of FFPs and market scope, and this may 
explain how an established firm accommodates rather than matches the LCC entrant. Thus, 
the airline industry seems to be one of fat cat incumbents pursued by puppy dog LCC entrants 
(Call and Keeler, 1985), where an incumbent able to segment its markets can effectively and 
very rapidly make its pricing competitive in order to hold on to price-sensitive passengers, 
while using tools such as FFPs to preserve the loyalty of higher-yield segments without price 
matching (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). In addition, this incumbent behaviour is reinforced by 
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entry regulations that increase market power derived from SwCs. First-mover advantages, in 
terms of slot-constrained or gate-constrained airports (Peteraf, 1993), allow established 
carriers (formerly regulated during the first period) to obtain advantages from privileged 
access to scarce airport resources (slots and gates) which constitute important barriers to entry 
for LCCs (Borenstein, 1989). And FFPs can take advantage of a large, single-carrier route 
network (Oliveira and Huse, 2009). So, under entry capacity restrictions, established airlines 
have less incentive to reduce costs when competing against LCC entrants compared to 
formerly regulated ones.
However, results change with the removal of airport capacity restrictions in Spain’s domestic 
airline market (2006-2009), with all three SwCs indicators becoming more relevant when 
facing LCC entrants than when facing formerly regulated ones. This evidence does not allow 
for the rejection of Hypothesis 2. This result could be explained by the dynamic effects of 
SwCs, where in a context without price and entry restrictions, prices will substantially fall 
because new low SwCs customers who prefer lower quality levels will appear (Gual and 
Vives, 1991; Villas-Boas, 2015). Therefore, there is no place for a pacifist attitude in 
incumbents that are facing LCCs. In the new situation, the incumbent is characterised as 
aggressive because it is being pursued by aggressive LCC entrants (see Call and Keeler, 
1985). In addition, this incumbent behaviour will be exacerbated by an environment that 
eliminates entrant capacity restrictions. In an unrestricted entry airline environment, the fat 
cat strategy will cease to apply over time: as an LC entrant airline becomes better established, 
it will be able to expand frequencies, build up its network, and become more trusted by 
business people as a means of travel. If there are no airport capacity restrictions, the incoming 
carrier can perform a large-scale entry (aggressive entry), which could be perceived as a threat 
by incumbent competitors who can react quickly and robustly to such an entry (Gatignon and 
Bansal, 1990).
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In brief, these results suggest that in the first period (2000-2005), under stable SwCs in a price 
and entry restricted industry, incumbent carriers (which are mainly formerly regulated during this 
period) tend to act as fat cats towards the entry of puppy dog LCCs; whereas in the second period 
(2006-2009), under dynamic SwCs due to the absence of price and entry restrictions in the 
industry, incumbent carriers tend to behave as top dogs towards the entry of lean and hungry 
LCCs. From a route-level analysis, these results support the findings and managerial implications 
suggested in Section 4.1. That is, formerly regulated carriers adjust their operating costs above 
all during the second period to improve their efficiency relative to the new LCCs, through 
aircraft reallocations at route-level, investments in new aircraft models and setting up a LC 
subsidiary to operate in short-haul routes, as is the case of Iberia’s venture Clickair, set up in 
2006.
5. Conclusions, managerial implications and limitations
This research analyses the role of SwCs on established firm cost behaviour towards a 
competitive entry in the airline sector. A dynamic reaction model is defined in order to analyse 
the moderating role of the type of entrant on the relationship between SwCs and incumbent cost 
reaction to entry, and the moderating role of the regulatory and competitive environment (airport 
capacity restriction) on this relationship. Results show that SwCs have important dynamic effects 
on incumbent reaction to entry. In a context with stable SwCs in a price and entry restricted 
industry, a decrease in SwCs leads to a smaller incumbent cost reduction when competing with 
LC entrants compared to formerly regulated ones. Conversely, when SwCs become unstable in 
an industry with unrestricted price and entry, a decrease in SwCs leads to greater incumbent cost 
reduction when competing with LC entrants as opposed to formerly regulated ones. 
This study has important implications for both public regulators and airline managers. In a 
period with price and entry restrictions, the use of FFPs by established carriers also acts as an 
anticompetitive tool, and according to Lederman (2008), public intervention to increase 
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competition should target the sources of this advantage, such as the scarcity of airport 
facilities and the SwCs themselves created through FFPs. To promote the entry of new 
carriers, regulators should monitor the evidence of incumbent hub dominance when entrants 
complain about slots and gates allocation (Lijesen et al., 2001). Moreover, it could be 
necessary to reduce hub power by controlling the use of FFPs, for example, through guides 
that limit non-lineal features of FFPs or by taxing miles received by business travellers 
(Lijesen et al., 2001). Authors such as de Boer and Gudmunsson (2012) even state that FFPs 
should be eliminated for domestic routes, so that carriers take notice of this regulatory action 
and try to establish more sustainable loyalty programs (Kearney, 1989). Conversely, in a 
period without price and entry restrictions, there is less need to perform such regulatory 
interventions on FFPs because they actually increase competition between carriers (Caminal 
and Claici, 2007; Dowling and Uncles, 1997). In fact, when several carriers adopt FFPs, the 
competition for profits can become so intense that aggregate supply profits tend to be reduced 
(Fong and Liu, 2011). Second, the competitive situation where LC entrants start to become 
under attack, as occurred in the second period observed here, also has important policy 
implications, such as the government support of mergers between formerly regulated 
companies (i.e., Iberia and British Airways) to improve efficiency, as well as the termination 
of grants that LC airlines received during the pre-financial crisis that struck in 2008. These 
subsidies helped Ryanair and EasyJet, among others, to enter into new markets, through the 
operation of new routes. This situation has been criticised by several authors (e.g., Barbot, 
2006; Graham and Shaw, 2008).
For airline managers, firstly, those working for an incumbent should analyse its competitive 
environment from a twofold perspective: entrant airline cost structure and incumbent SwCs. 
While incumbent carriers may perceive LC entrants as potentially threatening rivals, entrants 
with less efficient cost structures should be their actual target in a context of stable SwCs. 
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However, in a context of unstable SwCs, while incumbent firms may perceive entrants with 
less efficient cost structures as potentially dangerous rivals, it is the LC entrants that should be 
their actual target (Kangis and O’Reilly, 2003). In fact, currently, the LC model dominates 
regional airline industries worldwide, and the ultra-low-cost airlines have great business 
previsions. In any case, although this situation could be explained by SwCs and the evolution 
of customer loyalty through the use of FFPs, nowadays, loyalty programs are not exclusive to 
airlines: websites such as Orbitz and Travelocity offer discounts and rewards for their 
customers, regardless of the airline used.
Second, attacks on LC entrants should distinguish the routes (markets) that they run. In fact, 
formerly regulated carriers are adjusting their costs through aircraft reallocations at route-
level to adapt them to the demand, and are setting up LC subsidiaries to operate short-haul 
routes. Third, these results make it easier to analyse the impact of a managerial decision 
(market entry) on incumbent behaviour and, therefore, to predict incumbents’ most likely cost 
response to entry. Thus, the effects of stable SwCs in the airline industry may lead to an 
incumbent fat cat strategy of capturing a client base and accommodating LC entrants which 
follow a puppy dog strategy. Whereas unstable SwCs may lead to more efficient entrants 
destabilising the industry and generating competitive pressures on incumbents to improve 
their efficiency; leading to an optimal incumbent top dog strategy, which responds 
aggressively to LC entrants that follow a lean and hungry strategy. 
This paper has some limitations that are potential areas of future research. First, since the 
objective of this study is to analyse the incumbent cost reaction (short and mid-term) to entry, for 
multiple periods, the proxy outlined by Shy (2002) has been used for the monetary SwCs, as well 
as other dimensions of SwCs such as incumbent FFPs and incumbent destination network 
(Carlsson and Löfgren, 2006), also used as longitudinal measurements in several industries. 
Future studies should include other sources of SwCs in the airline sector. Second, the results 
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outlined here are specific to the Spanish domestic airline market. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to analyse other airline markets in order to test the validity of these results under 
similar deregulations of the market. For instance, in addition to short-haul domestic routes it 
would be useful to study mid- and long-haul routes (international), given that distance is a key 
factor for understanding scale and scope economies in the airline industry (Fageda and 
Fernández-Villadangos 2009). Third, it would be beneficial to evaluate the impact of regulation 
on behaviour, by implementing a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), given that the sample 
covers a period when price and entry restrictions were in place and the subsequent lifting of these 
restrictions.
Footnotes:
[1] The model intends to study the incumbent’s decision in period t (in terms of cost variation, ),  ∆y𝑘,𝑡
given the new entry, through other relevant variables at the beginning of the period (Xk,t-1). For 
each reaction, information on the quarter prior to entry (-1) and six quarters after entry (0, +1,…, 
+6) is used to measure anticipated incumbent reaction and the short and mid-term post-entry 
reaction respectively.
[2] This procedure does not rely on aggregated cost measurements (obtained from accounting 
statements) to make route approximations, but rather it considers the specific features in terms of 
costs for each carrier and on each route, such as: the aircraft used, the number of passengers, taxes 
paid, the approximate fuel consumption, the labour costs, etc. Thus, it allows for an estimation of 
the full operating cost for each carrier for a route for a given period (for more detail regarding the 
Spanish case, see Sancho-Esper and Mas-Ruiz, 2016).
[3] Despite the concept of SwCs being largely studied in the literature (see Klemperer 1987a, 1987b), 
several authors such as Jones et al. (2002) and Burnham et al. (2003), state that its empirical 
application has been limited in time-series or panel data studies because there are measurement 
difficulties over time given its multidimensional nature (where customers can not be asked about 
previous periods).
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[4] Clickair ceased operations in 2009. Iberia then developed a new LCC, Iberia Express, after the 
foundation of International Airlines Group (IAG).
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Table 1
Descriptive analysis of operating costs (magnitude -IOC- and cost reaction to entry –difference between 
quarters) and of service elements (incumbent flight frequency) in the Spanish domestic market, 2000-2009.
Incumbent Operating Cost
(IOC)
Incumbent Cost Reaction
(ICR)
Incumbent Flight Frequency
(IFF)
Type of 
Incumbent
Type of Entrant
2000-2005 2006-2009 2000-2005 2006-2009 2000-2005 2006-2009
Formerly Reg. 10,964.3 10,899.4 300.3 -225.0 50.5 86.1Formerly 
regulated LCC 11,708.0 14,559.8 366.2 -507.6 136.5 75.9
Total Form. Reg. incumbents 11,214.1 13,615.6 322.5 -434.7 79.4 78.5
Formerly Reg. 8,783.2 13,202.7 285.0 22.5 39.3 46,36LCC
LCC 10,582.9 12,751.6 417.7 40.8 42.2 49,79
Total LCC incumbents 11,149.8 13,528.2 323.1 -420.1 29.8 49.1
Notes: The unit of analysis is the incumbent operating cost (in constant euros), for each reaction in a given quarter.
Flight frequency = number of monthly flights of the incumbent carrier on a given route.
All figures are the average for the total sample of reactions (n=620) divided into two subperiods (n2000-05=266 and
n2006-09=354)
Table 2
Descriptive analysis of Switching costs measurements by carrier, type of incumbent and period
Switching costs
Monetary SwCs Incumbent market scope FFP age (months)Incumbent 
type
Incumbent 
carrier 2000-05 2006-09 t-stat 2000-05 2006-09 t-stat 2000-05 2006-09 t-stat
Air Europa 3.45 4.49 9.95*** 6.53 6.21 -1,69* 40.35 99.28 63.12***
Iberia 3.43 4.26 11.42*** 9.83 10.50 1,88* 149.16 201.13 48.11***
Spanair 3.40 4.62 14.22*** 7.35 10.06 8,26*** 8.90 57.62 68.89***
Air Nostrum 3.59 4.83 9.21*** 4.47 4.16 -1,91* 77.16 127.61 36.70***
Binter Canar 2.84 7.16 34.36*** 2.92 3.44 1,66* 0.00 42.80 63.78***
Formerly 
regulated
Naysa 2.43 na na 0.50 na na 0.00 na na
Formerly regulated avg. 3.45 4.66 24.56** 7.12 8.06 5.10** 63.35 109.86 29.88***
EasyJet na 2.80 na na 0.87 na na 11.25 na
Air Berlin 2.51 3.94 7.02*** 3.88 3.95 0.31ns 0 37.97 26.53***
Clickair na 4.98 na na 1.67 na na 37.80 na
Vueling 3.94 3.77 -1.05ns 2.04 4.00 7.51*** 0 10.93 13.51***
LCC
Ryanair na 2.75 na na 0.95 na na 9.50 na
LCC avg. 2.65 3.83 7.71*** 3.70 3.71 0.04ns 0 16.25 13.83***
Notes: t-stat = t statistic to test difference between two independent samples without assuming equal variances (reject 
variance equality in every case with the Levene's test)
*, **, *** Significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively
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Table 3
Incumbent cost reaction to entry model: AB difference GMM estimation, 2000-2005 and 2006-2009
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
INCUMBENT SWITCHING COST: 2000-2005 2006-2009 2000-2005 2006-2009 2000-2005 2006-2009
Monetary SwC(t-1) x D low-cost entrant 269.55 -2,882.61** 268.24 -1,975.98***
Monetary SwC(t-1) x D formerly reg. entrant -133.12 -1,904.09*** 5.82 -1,095.88***
Market scope(t-1) x D low-cost entrant -154.26* -196.74*** -164.70** -249.35*
Market scope(t-1) x D formerly reg. entrant -379.66* 7.31 -382.72* 33.76
FFP age(t-1) x D low-cost entrant 0.19 -106.04*** 6.42 -170.75***
FFP age(t-1) x D formerly reg. entrant -5.21 -8.26 -6.15 -89.69***
CONTROL VARIABLES:
Δ COST I (t-1) -0.22*** -0.01 -0.21*** -0.01 -0.21*** -0.01
Incumbent market dominance (t-1) -20.89** -4.99 -20.99*** 11.18 -20.58*** 12.38
Market concentration (t-1) 0.13** 1.18** 0.08 -0.07 0.06 0.51***
D Small (destination tourism index t-1) 1,165.99 -2,130.68 421.95 3,937.23*** 521.66 47.13
SPECIFICATION TESTS:
   z1 (joint significance regressors) 20.61*** 50.67*** 22.94*** 10.39*** 19.19*** 35.03***
   z2 (joint significance fixed effects) 1.78* 1.66* 1.71* 1.86* 1.67* 1.66*
   m1 (1st order correlation) -5.41*** -8.00** -5.01*** -8.29*** -4.94*** -8.36***
   m2 (2nd order correlation) -1.61 -0.31 -1.22 -0.60 -1.20 0.24
   Hansen over identification test 155.23 158.67 253.33 300.82 255.03 299.62
Note: Dependent variable: incumbent cost reaction (ΔCOST i, t). GMM difference estimation (Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
with period fixed effects and robust variance/covariance for small samples (Windmeijer, 2005).
Total n=4,960 (620 reactions x 8 per.), n2000-2005=2,128 (266 reactions x 8 per.) and n2006-2009=2,832 (354 reactions x 8 per.)
*, **, *** Significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively
Page 35 of 36 Academia Revista Latinoamericana de Administracion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Academ
ia Revista Latinoam
ericana de Adm
inistración36
APPENDIX
Table A1. 
Incumbent operating cost response to entry model: variables and sources
Variable Type of variable Description References Sources
∆Costk,t Dependent 
(in differences)
Full operating flight cost of 
carrier i, in route k and quarter t 
(Difference between quarters)
Calculated costs 
(direct and indirect) 
based on ATA 
standards (Radnoti, 
2002, Shaw, 2007 and 
Wensveen, 2007. For 
more detail in the 
Spanish case, see 
Sancho-Esper and 
Mas-Ruiz, (2016).
- AENA: traffic and taxes.
- Jet fuel costs: ARA Market.
- Aircraft costs and depreciation: 
DEAGEL and producers’ websites.
- Labour costs: Collective 
agreements, annual reports, etc.
- Luggage and ticketing costs: Flight 
care, Ground force, GDS firms, 
Travolution, etc.
Type of entrant 
(dummy)
Independent
Type of entrant dummy: formerly 
regulated vs. low-cost entrant.
Peteraf (1993)
SwC 1: 
Monetary SwC
Independent
Difference between the average 
price (Pi,t) of the focal carrier i in 
period t, for every route, and the 
average price of its competitors in 
period t (Pr,t), for every route
Shy (2002), Maicas et 
al. (2009), Gómez and 
Maicas (2011); Polo et 
al. (2011)
- AENA: traffic.
- SABI and COMPUSTAT financial 
and accounting data.
SwC 2: 
FFP market scope
Independent
Destinations served by the 
incumbent from both the origin 
and destination airports of the 
route (value of the network)
Breadth of the 
relationship between 
the current customer 
and the focal firm 
(Polo and Sesé, 2009).
SwC 3: 
FFP age
Independent
Months that the incumbent carrier 
has an FFP before the period 
under study (potential of FFP 
miles achievement)
Length of the 
relationship (Polo and 
Sesé, 2009)
- AENA: traffic.
- Corporate websites of included 
carriers and Annual reports.
Incumbent market 
dominance
Control
Incumbent market share in a 
given route at the beginning of t
Baum and Korn 
(1996) - AENA: traffic.
Market concentration Control
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of 
the carriers operating on a route at 
the beginning of period t
Borenstein (1989); 
Baum and Korn 
(1996)
- AENA: traffic.
Destination tourism 
index
Control
Relative tourist orientation of 
passengers on a given route as a 
function of a tourism measure of 
the passengers’ destination area 
(relative weight of tourism GDP 
at the destination province, 
relative to its total GDP)
Borenstein (1989)
- Spanish Annual Statistical Report 
“La Caixa”, 2000-09.
Source: Prepared by the authors
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